Detecting Mode Confusion Through Formal Modeling and Analysis by Potts, James N. & Miller, Steven P.
NASA/CR-1999-208971
Detecting Mode Confusion Through
Formal Modeling and Analysis
Steven P. Miller and James N. Potts
Rockwell Collins, Inc., Cedar Rapids, Iowa
January 1999
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990019552 2020-06-15T22:46:19+00:00Z
The NASA STI Program Office ... in Profile
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to
the advancement of aeronautics and space
science. The NASA Scientific and Technical
Information (STI) Program Office plays a key
part in helping NASA maintain this important
role.
The NASA STI Program Office is operated by
Langley Research Center, the lead center for
NASA's scientific and technical information. The
NASA STI Program Office provides access to the
NASA STI Database, the largest collection of
aeronautical and space science STI in the world.
The Program Office is also NASA's institutional
mechanism for disseminating the results of its
research and development activities. These
results are published by NASA in the NASA STI
Report Series, which includes the following
report types:
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of
completed research or a major significant
phase of research that present the results of
NASA programs and include extensive
data or theoretical analysis. Includes
compilations of significant scientific and
technical data and information deemed to
be of continuing reference value. NASA
counterpart of peer-reviewed formal
professional papers, but having less
stringent limitations on manuscript length
and extent of graphic presentations.
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific
and technical findings that are preliminary
or of specialized interest, e.g., quick release
reports, working papers, and
bibliographies that contain minimal
annotation. Does not contain extensive
analysis.
CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and
technical findings by NASA-sponsored
contractors and grantees.
CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected
papers from scientific and technical
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by
NASA.
SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific,
technical, or historical information from
NASA programs, projects, and missions,
often concerned with subjects having
substantial public interest.
TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific
and technical material pertinent to NASA's
mission.
Specialized services that complement the STI
Program Office's diverse offerings include
creating custom thesauri, building customized
databases, organizing and publishing research
results ... even providing videos.
For more information about the NASA STI
Program Office, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI Program Home Page
at http://www.sti.nasa.gov
• E-mail your question via the Internet to
help@sti.nasa.gov
• Fax your question to the NASA STI Help
Desk at (301) 621-0134
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at
(301) 621-0390
Write to:
NASA STI Help Desk
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
7121 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076-1320
NASA/CR-1999-208971
Detecting Mode Confusion Through
Formal Modeling and Analysis
Steven P. Miller and James N. Potts
Rockwell Collins, Inc., Cedar Rapids, Iowa
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199
Prepared for Langley Research Center
under Contract NAS1-19704
January 1999
Available from:
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI)
7121 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076-1320
(301) 621-0390
National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161-2171
(703) 605-6000
Abstract
Aircraft safety has improved steadily over the last few decades. While much of this improvement
can be attributed to the introduction of advanced automation in the cockpit, the growing
complexity of these systems also increases the potential for the pilots to become confused about
what the automation is doing. This phenomenon, often referred to as mode confusion, has been
involved in several accidents involving modern aircraft. This report describes an effort by
Rockwell Collins and NASA Langley to identify potential sources of mode confusion through
two complementary strategies. The first is to create a clear, executable model of the automation,
connect it to a simulation of the flight deck, and use this combination to review of the behavior
of the automation and the man-machine interface with the designers, pilots, and experts in human
factors. The second strategy is to conduct mathematical analyses of the model by translating it
into a formal specification suitable for analysis with automated tools. The approach is illustrated
by applying it to a hypothetical, but still realistic, example of the mode logic of a Flight
Guidance System.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Aircraft safety has improved steadily over the last few decades [23]. While much of this
improvement can be attributed to the introduction of advanced automation in the cockpit [2], the
growing complexity of these systems also increases the potential for the pilots to become
confused about what the automation is doing. Of particular concern is the proliferation of modes
in these systems, where modes are defined as mutually exclusive sets of system behavior [13].
For this reason, the phenomenon is often referred to as "mode confusion".
There is a growing body of evidence that mode confusion is a legitimate concern in complex
automated systems in which humans play a significant role. Several accidents and incidents
involving mode confusion in modem aircraft are listed in [9]. A study conducted by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology found 184 incidents attributed to mode awareness
problems in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) [9]. In [8], the author describes
the concerns of pilots and researchers with the human computer interface in modern "glass
cockpits". The FAA recently hosted a workshop on Autoflight Mode Awareness that identified
"autoflight mode confusion as a significant safety concern" [1]. In [2], Charles Billings writes
(pg. 183):
Most of our accidents can be traced to the human operators of the systems, and increasing
numbers can be traced to the interactions of humans with automated systems.
This paper describes an effort by Rockwell Collins and NASA Langley to identify potential
sources of mode confusion through modeling and analysis of the automation. This approach
makes use of two complementary strategies. The first is to create a clear, executable model of the
automation, connect it to a simulation of the flight deck, and use this combination to review of
the behavior of the automation and the man-machine interface with engineers, the pilots, and
experts in human factors. This has several benefits. First, it forces the designers to commit to a
clear, conceptual model of the automation. Second, it facilitates discussion between the system
designers, experts in human factors, and the flight crew. Third, can be used in training to convey
an accurate mental model of the automation to the flight crew.
The second strategy is to conduct mathematical analyses of the model. This is accomplished by
translating the model into a formal specification suitable for analysis with automated tools. This
model can be used to show that safety properties hold for all states reachable by the model. It is
also possible to characterize some sources of mode confusion as mathematical statements about
the model and use these tools to automatically find these potential sources.
The approachis illustratedby applying it to an examplespecificationof the mode logic of a
Flight GuidanceSystem created by Collins to investigatedifferent methods of modeling
requirements.While this exampleis hypotheticaland doesnot describean actual aircraft in
service,it is still complexenoughto serveasarealisticexample[15].
The rest of this report is organizedas follows. Chapter2 providesbackgroundinformation,
including a brief description of related work and an overview of Flight Control Systems.
Chapter3 discussesthemotivationbehindthis projectandprovidesanoverviewof the approach.
Chapter4 discussesthe rationalefor the structureof the modelogic, illustratesthe behaviorof
themodel,and describespotential sourcesof modeconfusionfound in the example.Chapter5
describesthe formalmodelof themodelogic createdin PVS,while Chapter6 discussessomeof
thepropertiesprovenaboutthismodel.Finally, Chapter7 summarizesconclusionsandidentifies
possiblefuturedirections.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes related work, provides a brief overview of a Flight Guidance System
(FGS), and discusses the history of the FGS used as the example in this report.
2.1 Related Work
In [12], Nancy Leveson describes how operators create mental models of a system in order to
understand and predict its responses to their inputs and the environment. Mode confusion is a
discrepancy between the operators perceived and actual state of the automation, either due to a
faulty mental model (i.e., a mental model that is not an accurate abstraction of the system) or due
to the operator losing track of the state of the automation. In either case, the outcome can be one
or more inappropriate commands to the system.
Leveson also points out how different individuals may form different mental models of the
automation, based on their experiences and needs. For example, the designer may form a mental
model based on mathematical models appropriate for situations where important decisions need
not be made quickly, while the operator may form a mental model that emphasizes making
diagnoses and responses quickly.
In [13], Leveson, et.al., discuss an approach to detecting error-prone automation features through
modeling and analysis of the software. They also identify six categories of design that have
historically been sources of mode confusion:
1. Interface interpretation errors
2. Inconsistent behavior
3. Indirect mode changes
4. Operator authority limits
5. Unintended side effects
6. Lack of appropriate feedback
The importance of an accurate mental model of avionics systems by the flight crew has been
recognized by several researchers. Charles Billings argues for human-centered automation
designed to work cooperatively with pilots and air traffic controllers in the pursuit of stated
objectives [2]. While acknowledging that automation has done much to make aircraft safer, he
points out that new classes of problems have emerged due to failures in the human-machine
interface. He states (pg. 4):
In particular, we have seen the appearance of incidents and accidents that indicate
failures to understand automation behavior. We have seen errors in choice of operating
modes, lack of mode awareness, and inability to determine what the automation was
doing.
Billings also identifies some of the sources of mode confusion. These include;
1. Complexity (particularly in the number of modes and interactions between modes)
2. Brittleness (inability to respond correctly at the margins of the operating range)
3. Opacity (inadequate display of what the automation is doing)
4. Literalism (inability to respond correctly to unanticipated situations)
5. Training (lack of training of automation behavior)
This last point emphasizes the need to convey to the pilot an accurate mental model of the
automation. On (pg. 146), he states;
An adequate internal model of an automated system is vital to a pilot's ability to predict
how that system will function under novel circumstances.
Other researchers have concurred on this point. In [20], Sarter and Woods write:
What is needed is a better understanding of how the machine operates, not just how to
operate the machine.
Of particular concern seems to be the modes that control the vertical behavior of the aircraft. An
MIT study described in [9] examined 184 incidents attributable to mode awareness problems
found in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). They found that 74% of the errors
involved confusion in vertical navigation, while only 26% involved horizontal navigation. The
researchers attribute this to lack of appropriate feedback on vertical navigation. Another major
factor is the greater complexity of vertical navigation, which involves different combination of
elevator and thrust controls.
Tony Lambregts, the FAA National Resource Specialist for Automated Controls, agrees that the
interaction of elevator and thrust controls for vertical navigation is an important source of mode
confusion, but argues that the problem is not so much lack of consideration of human factors as
adherence to outdated designs [11]. Flight Control Systems have evolved from the earliest
designs of the Wright brothers through the gradual introduction of new control functions, where
the control laws are based on single input single output (SISO) designs. For example, control of
the Autopilot and Autothrottle are not tightly integrated at the innermost level. Instead, this
integration is achieved at higher levels in the Flight Control System. Lambregts argues that since
the response of the aircraft to pitch and thrust commands are inherently coupled by the dynamics
of flight, this results in a proliferation of modes in order to achieve the desired behavior. By
integrating control for inherently coupled functions through the use of multiple input multiple
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output(MIMO) controllaws,heclaimstheFlight ControlSystemcanbegreatlysimplified,with
a substantialreductionin systemmodesandpotentialfor modeconfusion.
2.2 An Overview of Flight Guidance Systems
A Flight_Guidance System (FGS) is a component of the overall Flight Control System (FCS)
(see Figure 1). The FGS compares the measured state of an aircraft (position, speed, and attitude)
to the desired state and generates pitch and roll guidance commands to minimize the difference
between the measured and desired state. When engaged, the Autopilot translates these
commands into movement of the aircraft's control surfaces necessary to achieve the commanded
changes about the lateral and vertical axes.
An FGS can be further broken down into the mode logic and the flight control laws. The mode
logic accepts commands from the flight crew, the Flight Management System (FMS), and
information about the current state of the aircraft to determine which system modes are active.
The active modes in turn determine which flight control laws are used to generate the pitch and
roll guidance commands. The active lateral and vertical modes are displayed (annunciated) to
the flight crew on the Flight Director, a portion of the Electronic Flight Instrumentation System
(EFIS). The magnitude and direction of the lateral (roll) and vertical (pitch) commands
generated by the FGS are also displayed on the EFIS as guidance cues.
Flight
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Crew Interface
Crew 1
Selections
FGS
IMode Logic
Control Laws
T Crew
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Figure 1 - Flight Control System
2.3 The Example Flight Guidance System
The approach described in this report was investigated using an example specification of the
mode logic of a Flight Guidance System for a business jet/commuter class aircraft. This example
was created by Collins to investigate different techniques for requirements modeling and
analysis. The original specification was created using the CoRE methodology and has been
placed in the public domain. It is fully described in [15]. Since that time, the same example has
been translated into Z [5], SMV [17], SCR [16], T-VEC [3], and now ObjecTime [21] and PVS
[18]. When determining how to model specific features in ObjecTime and PVS, the original
CoRE specification [15] was used as the standard of "correct" behavior.
The original specification was an example derived through study of several Flight Guidance
Systems. Moreover, to keep the size of the example tractable, it was simplified in several ways.
First, it was restricted to specifying only the mode logic of the FGS. Second, several more
complex features found in recent aircraft, such as the more complex vertical navigation modes,
were omitted. Third, the example deals almost entirely with "normal" behavior and does not
specify how the system should respond to internal errors such as failed sensors. Finally, the
example does not specify the hardware interfaces (i.e., the CoRE input and output variables and
the IN and OUT relations). Despite these limitations, the specification is sufficiently rich that it
meets the goal of providing a realistic industrial example for the evaluation of other methods,
including those described in this report. However, it is important to note that it does not describe
an actual or planned Collins product.
Chapter 3
Overview of the Approach
3.1 Motivation
This project was motivated by several goals. These included creating a high level, dynamic
model of the automation's behavior, performing automated analyses of this model, and
supporting a product family approach to development. In some cases, these goals were in
conflict and decisions had to be made regarding which were most important. These issues are
discussed more fully in the following sections.
3.1.1 Visualization of the Automation
The main objective of this project was to provide a clear, comprehensible view of the underlying
automation that could be executed. Our belief was that connecting this model to a mock-up of
the Flight Control Panel (FCP) and the Electronic Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS) would
provide a common focus that would promote discussion between pilots, experts in human
factors, and the system designers. Our experiences to date have shown that, if anything, we
underestimated the power of this technique. In every demonstration, the visualization has
generated vigorous, positive debate between these groups.
A secondary objective was to force the development and commitment to a high level design of
the automation. In projects developed without such a vision, design choices may be based on
local concerns, such as fixing the immediate problem at hand or achieving a certain level of
performance. This often results in unnecessary complexity that is confusing to both the users and
developers of the system. Moreover, this complexity tends to grow as the system evolves over
time. Having a clear, high level model of the automation encourages the developers (and
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customers) to make changes consistent with this model as time progresses.
Finally, we were interested in whether such a dynamic, high level model of the automation
would be of value during training of the flight crew. Would the availability of such a model
enable the flight crew to obtain a better mental model of the automation? Would it allow them to
internalize patterns so that they would be better able to predict the behavior of the system? For
existing systems, could such models be used to explain confusing behavior more clearly? Or
would the availability of such models simply add more complexity to pilots already
overwhelmed with details?
1 Of course, this doesn't exclude explicitly stating the design guidelines. In fact, they may be easier to state in the
presence of a high level model.
3.1.2 Support for Automated Analysis
The value of automated analysis of properties such as consistency and certain forms of
completeness has been clearly demonstrated in a number of different tools [6], [7], [16]. Other
projects have shown how application specific properties, such as safety properties or desirable
system behaviors, can be verified through the use of theorem provers [18], [14], and model
checkers [17]. However, there are very few examples of using these techniques to check for
properties related to human factors. For example, responding differently to a button press in
different modes may not be an error, but it would be nice to know where such behavior is present
in a model. The most interesting questions here are how such properties can be stated in a formal
system and what sorts of properties relevant to human factors are amenable to automated
analysis. Obtaining a least a partial answer to these questions was another important goal.
3.1.3 Support for Product Families
Finally, if complex systems are to be affordable, planning for change and reuse has to play a
larger role in the future. Companies typically build variations of the same products over and over
and are looking for strategies that support the systematic reuse of common artifacts.
One such approach is Product Family Engineering, also known as Domain Engineering. Product
Family Engineering is a methodology that focuses on creating software and hardware assets that
can be systematically reused in each new member of the product family [4], [22], [24]. Central to
the Product Family approach is the development of a domain architecture. The domain
architecture consists of those requirements, design, implementation, and verification artifacts that
are common to all members of the family and the variations of these artifacts that are supported
by the domain. New instances of the product family (applications) are created by selecting from
the assets already available and supplementing and tailoring them as needed to create a specific
product. New product specific artifacts are carefully factored back into the domain architecture
to enrich the base of available assets.
Prior to this project, Collins had conducted a Commonality Analysis [24] of the FGS mode logic
described in [15] and developed a tentative product family architecture for the FGS.
Consequently, an important goal of this project was to build on that work and develop a formal
model consistent with that architecture.
3.1.4 Logistics
Finally, experience with previous demonstrations had convinced us that we wanted a very stable,
portable demonstration that we could pick up and take anywhere at a moment's notice. To ensure
widespread availability of the work products, we wanted to avoid the use of proprietary tools or
components that were not available to the general public. We also realized having sufficient
screen area to display both the visualization of the automation and the mockup of the flight deck
would be essential.
3.2 Approach
Theapproach taken in this project directly addressed the issues raised in the previous section and
is illustrated in Figure 2. Executable model were used to drive visualizations of both the Flight
Deck (i.e., the Flight Control Panel and the EFIS) and the internal state behavior of the
automation. Formal models were derived from the executable models and used for formal
analysis with a theorem prover. This approach is discussed in greater detail in the following
sections.
I nalysis via I
Theorem Prover
PvsIModel
I Executable I
Model
Visualization
of Internal States
Figure 2 - Overall Strategy
3.2.1 Visualizations
ObjecTime [21] was chosen as the modeling enviromnent since the ObjecTime models could be
executed and easily connected to visualizations of the Flight Control Panel and EFIS. ObjecTime
also has a Statecharts-like capability for visualizing the behavior of the models that we hoped
could be used directly in demonstrations. Finally, we were confident that ObjecTime was
compatible with the product family architecture previously developed for the FGS.
Thevisualizationsof the Flight Control Panelandthe ElectronicFlight InstrumentationSystem
were amongthe simplestpart of the project to
create.OurswerecreatedusingBorlandDelphi 2
The visualization of the Electronic Flight
InstrumentationSystem(EFIS)is shownin Figure
3. The EFIS is the primary flight display in the
cockpit. It displaysessentialinformationaboutthe
aircraft, suchas airspeed,vertical speed,attitude
information, the horizon line, and heading.
Particularlyrelevantfor this project arethe flight
modeannunciationsat thetop of thedisplay (e.g.,
HDG and PTCH), the AP engagedannunciation
locatedat the upper left of the sky/groundball,
andthe guidancecuesshownin the centerof the
sky/groundball. The combination of the flight
mode annunciationand the guidancecues are
often referredto asthe Flight Director. Only the
modeannunciationsandtheguidancecuesneeded
to be activecomponentsof the EFISvisualization
for thisproject.
The visualizationof the Flight Control Panel is
shownin Figure4. TheFlight ControlPanelis the
primary user interface with the Flight Control Figure 3- EFIS
System.It includesswitchesfor turningthe Flight
Director on and off (FD), switchesfor selecting
the different flight modessuchasvertical speed(VS), lateralnavigation(NAV), headinghold
(HDG), altitudehold (ALT), and approach(APPR),the Vertical Speed/PitchWheel, and the
autopilotdisconnectbar.TheFCP alsosuppliesfeedbackto thecrew, indicatingselectedmodes
by lighting lampsoneithersideof aselectedmode'sbutton.
Figure 4 - Flight Control Panel
Borland Delphi is a trademark of the Inprise Corporation.
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As the project progressed, it became clear that the ObjecTime diagrams were too cluttered with
design detail to use for communication with pilots and experts in human factors. This was easily
remedied by creating our own visualization of the automation and using the ObjecTime models
to drive it as well as the FCP and EFIS visualizations. An example of this visualization is shown
in Figure 5. High level views of the mode machines for the Flight Director, Autopilot, and each
of the lateral and vertical flight modes are shown. The current mode of each mode machine is
indicated by turning the mode a bright green (shown here as white). For example, in Figure 5 the
Flight Director is in state Cues On, the Autopilot is in state Engaged, the lateral navigation
(NAV) mode is in state Armed, the vertical speed (VS) mode is in state Active, and all other
lateral and vertical modes are in the state Cleared. Certain states are distinguished as active
states. When in these states, the associated mode is also said to be active and generates the pitch
and roll guidance commands used as inputs to the autopilot and the flight director. Stated
differently, if the Autopilot is engaged, the active lateral mode generates roll guidance
commands and the active vertical mode generates pitch guidance commands used to control the
aircraft. Active states are indicated on the visualization by a heavy red box (shown here as a gray
box) around the state or group of states. A few of the active states in Figure 5 include the Active
Engaged
1 Cleared Cleared
Cleared
............ Eleared
Cleared
Armed Cleared
Figure _ - Visualization of the FGS Modes
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state of Roll mode, the Armed and Track states of lateral Approach mode, and the Track state of
vertical Approach mode. As will be discussed later, only one lateral and one vertical mode can
be active at any given time. This property is emphasized in the visualization by placing the
active lateral states directly below each other. The active vertical states are laid out in a similar
fashion. In Figure 5, the active lateral mode is NAV and the active vertical mode is VS.
Having the capability of designing our own visualization of the automation turned out to be a
significant advantage. Since our focus was on conveying a very high level mental model, we
ended up removing details that obscured that model, but that would be necessary to fully specify
the system. Also, reviewers began suggesting changes to the model specifically for the purpose
of conveying the mental model, e.g., changing the color of all transitions just executed and
graying out transitions that were not possible. This made it clear that designing mental models of
the automation is an open area for further work.
3.2.2 Support for Automated Analysis
PVS was chosen for analyzing our models for application specific properties because it provides
a very powerful and general mechanism for stating and proving properties [18]. Also, we had
considerable in-house expertise with PVS from previous projects [14]. There was also previous
work done on translating ObjecTime models to PVS that gave us hope that we would be able to
automatically generate PVS specifications from ObjecTime [10].
Automatically generating PVS specifications from the ObjecTime models turned out to more
difficult than we had anticipated. While there was a fairly straightforward mapping from
individual ObjecTime actors to PVS specifications, these were of limited value unless a PVS
model was also created for the ObjecTime run-time system. For example, the details of how
events are sent, queued, and processed by actors are implicitly defined by the ObjecTime run-
time system. We decided that creating a PVS model of this infrastructure was beyond the scope
of the project.
Instead, we created PVS specifications by hand of the mode logic and reviewed them to try to
ensure the PVS and ObjecTime models defined the same behavior. While it is true that this broke
the automated link between the ObjecTime and PVS models and that proofs completed for the
PVS model may not be true of the ObjecTime model, it was still sufficient to explore the sorts of
properties that can be formally stated and verified, which was our original goal.
3.2.3 Support for Product Families
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, the cornerstone of Product Family engineering is developing an
architecture that supports the variation found in the family. To determine what variations were
common in Flight Guidance Systems, Collins had earlier conducted a Commonality Analysis of
several FGS systems [24]. This revealed that one of the most common variations was the
configuration of operational modes. Both the complement of operational modes installed and the
versions of individual modes varied from aircraft to aircraft. Thus, one aircraft might have lateral
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backcourse mode and the next aircraft might not. Two aircraft might both have lateral navigation
modes, but have slightly different versions of that mode.
However, there were also many properties common to all aircraft. In the systems studied, every
mode was either a lateral mode that controlled the aircraft about the roll axis or a vertical mode
that controlled the aircraft about the pitch axis. Every mode could either be active or inactive.
There could never be more than one lateral mode active at any time, and there could never be
more than one vertical mode active at any time. If the Flight Director was turned on, one lateral
mode and one vertical mode had to be active. There was always a default lateral mode and
default vertical mode that became active when the Flight Director was turned on or when the
active lateral or vertical mode was made inactive.
To exploit this commonality and support this variation, this project adopted an architecture for
the Flight Guidance System that made it straightforward to produce different configurations of
operational modes. This architecture is described in detail in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Structure of Mode Logic
The chapter provides an informal, intuitive presentation of the FGS mode logic. Since the
architecture of the FGS also affects presentation of the mode logic, it first discusses the rational
for this architecture. It then describes the behavior of the mode logic with a few examples. These
are typical of scenarios that can explored with the design engineers, the flight crew, and human
factor experts using the executable model and the visualizations. Finally, a few potential sources
of mode confusion found in the example FGS specification [15] are shown to demonstrate the
effectiveness of combining an executable model of the automation with the visualizations.
4.1 Rational for the FGS Architecture
As discussed in Chapter 3, support for a family of Flight Guidance Systems was one of the
primary factors in selecting the FGS architecture shown in Figure 6. At the lowest level, each
operational mode is treated as its own unit of functionality, with no knowledge of the properties,
or even the existence, of the other modes within the FGS. Each operational mode exports an
indication of whether it is active, whether it is armed, and if it is active, the guidance command
(roll for lateral modes and pitch for vertical modes) that it is computing. The lateral modes are
grouped into the Lateral Guidance component and the vertical modes are grouped into the
Vertical Guidance component.
The Lateral Guidance component enforces all constraints between the lateral modes. For
example, it ensures that one lateral mode is active when the Flight Director is on and ensures that
no more than one lateral mode is ever active. Any aircraft specific constraints between the lateral
modes are also enforced by Lateral Guidance. Lateral Guidance also exports the identify of the
current active lateral mode, the identity of all armed lateral modes, and the lateral guidance
command generated by the active lateral mode. Vertical Guidance serves a similar function for
the vertical modes, while the Flight Director component maintains the status (on, off, cues
displayed, cues hidden) of the Flight Director.
All of these are grouped within the Flight Guidance component. Flight Guidance exports the
status of the Flight Director, the identity of the current active lateral and vertical modes, the
identity of all armed lateral and vertical modes, and the lateral and vertical guidance commands.
Flight Guidance also enforces constraints between the Flight Director and the Lateral and
Vertical Guidance components. For example, it ensures that one lateral mode and vertical mode
are active when the Flight Director is turned on. It also enforces any constraints between
components that are aircraft specific. For example, a common constraint is that lateral Go
Around (GA) mode is active if, and only if, vertical Go Around mode is active
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Flight Guidance
Exports Flight Director Status, Active and Armed Lateral Modes, Lateral Guidance
Command, Active and Armed Vertical Modes, and Vertical Guidance Command
Specifies Constraints Between Flight Director, Lateral Guidance, and Vertical Guidance
Flight Director
Exports Flight Director Status
Lateral Guidance
Exports Active Lateral Mode, Armed Lateral
Modes, and Lateral Guidance Command
Specifies Constraints Between Lateral Modes
Vertical Guidance
Exports Active Vertical Mode, Armed Vertical
Modes, and Vertical Guidance Command
Specifies Constraints Between Vertical Modes
ROLL HDG NAV APPR GA PITCH VS ALT FLC APPR GA
In the following sections,
example described in [15],
Figure 6 - High Level FGS Architecture
The motivation behind this architecture is to minimize maintenance costs and to maximize reuse
between different members of the product family. This is achieved by ensuring:
the lateral and vertical modes all present similar interfaces to their parent
a mode does not know about the properties or existence of other modes in the aircraft
constraints between the siblings are localized in the appropriate parent.
the mode logic of a single member of this family, based on the
is described in the context of this architecture.
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4.2 Synchronization of the Mode Machines
Building upon the high-level architecture of the previous section, the FGS mode logic can most
easily be visualized as a collection of tightly synchronized, concurrent mode machines, one for
each component of the FGS (see Figure 7).
Most of the synchronization between the mode machines can be achieved by enforcing three
simple properties:
• If the flight director is on, one and only one lateral mode is active.
• If the flight director is on, one and only one vertical mode is active.
• If the flight director is off, all lateral and vertical modes are cleared.
ROLL
HDG
Flight Director
/_ 0 n \_
Autopilot
Lateral Modes
Cleared
Cleared
"( Active
\\
"( Active
x\
LAPPR _---
NAV
Active \
Vertical Modes
PITCH
VS
VAPPR
I_-_ Cleared
Q Armed
ALTHOLD
\
Cleared ).,
\
_( Active
Figure 7 - FGS Mode Structure
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Thesepropertiesstatethat whenthe flight directoris turnedon, theremustbeone activelateral
modeandoneactivevertical modeto produceroll andpitchcommands.Obviously,therecanbe
only one active lateralmodeandone activevertical mode controllingthe aircraft at anygiven
time.
To satisfythefirst two properties,two of themodemachines,lateralRoll andvertical Pitch,are
designatedasdefault modes. This designation means that if the Flight Director is on, and no
other modes are active, these two machines will be active. For example, if HDG mode is active
in the current state, and the HDG button is pressed on the Flight Control Panel, HDG will clear.
Since one lateral mode must be active, the default mode (ROLL) will become active (See Figure
8).
Likewise, with ROLL active, if the HDG button is pressed again, HDG will be activated. Since
only one lateral mode can be active, the previous active mode (ROLL) will be cleared (see
Figure 9).
These synchronizations have all been between the Flight Director and the Lateral and Vertical
modes, or within the Lateral and Vertical modes. More difficult are the synchronizations
between the Lateral and Vertical modes. In the CoRE FGS specification, Lateral Approach
(LAPPR) and Vertical Approach (VAPPR) are synchronized, so that when LAPPR enters Track,
VAPPR becomes Armed (see Figure 10 through Figure 12).
Lateral Modes
ROLL
HDG
LAPPR __
NAV
Lateral Modes
ROLL
HDG
LAPPR __
NAV
Active
Figure 8 - Activation of Default Mode
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Lateral Modes
ROLL
HDG
LAPPR
NAV
HDG Button\
Pressed
Lateral Modes
ROLL
HDG
LAPPR
NAV
Figure 9 - Ensuring Only One Mode is Active
Although closely related, LAPPR and VAPPR behave quite differently. In LAPPR, the Armed
state is an Active state, meaning that all other lateral modes are cleared when it is active. In the
case of VAPPR, the Armed state is not an Active state. When VAPPR is armed, another vertical
mode is actively producing pitch commands. In fact, the active vertical mode can be changed
while VAPPR is armed. Trying to change the active lateral mode while LAPPR is armed clears
LAPPR.
This difference is an example of a potential source of mode confusion cited by Leveson, et. al.,
[13], inconsistent behavior. While the difference is quite obvious in Figure 10 through Figure 12,
it was obscure enough in the original CoRE specification [15] that it was missed in several
inspections. This illustrates the value of creating a high level, executable model of the
automation.
LAPPR and VAPPR could be changed to have similar behaviors simply by not making LAPPR
Armed an active state. If desired, a constraint could be added such that whenever LAPPR entered
the Armed state, HDG was forced to be the active lateral mode. Of course, whether this actually
provided the desired behavior and reduced the potential for mode confusion would need to be
determined by experts in human factors, pilots, and the system engineers.
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Lateral Modes
ROLL
#(/ Active
\
HDG
#(/ Active
\
LAPPR
o--I_ Cleared
Active _\
NAV
/ Active \
Vertical Modes
PITCH
Cleared )_,
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VAPPR
Active
Armed
ALTHOLD
Active
Step 1 - LAPPR is Armed.
Figure 10 - Synchronization Between Lateral and Vertical Approach
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ROLL
HDG
LAPPR
NAV
Lateral Modes
Active
z_
Cleared
/-
Active
Active _\
Vertical Modes
VS
"( Active
VAPPR
Cleared
Active
ALTHOLD
Active
__J
Step 2 - The aircraft coming within lateral capture range causes LAPPR to
change to Track.
Step 3 - LAPPR changing to Track causes VAPPR to change to armed.
Figure 11 - Synchronization Between Lateral and Vertical Approach (Continued)
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Lateral Modes
ROLL
"_ Active
HDG
"_ Active
LAPPR
Cleared
/ Active /
NAV
/ Active /
Vertical Modes
PITCH
/ \
#( Active
\
VS
Active
VAPPR
ALTHOLD
"( Active
Step 4 - The aircraft coming within vertical capture range causes
VAPPR to change to Track, causing Pitch to clear.
Figure 12 - Synchronization Between Lateral and Vertical Approach (Continued)
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4.3 Examples of Possible Sources of Mode Confusion
The ability to visualize both the cockpit and the Flight Guidance modes simultaneously is critical
to understanding the actual behavior of the system. The following are examples of potential
sources of mode confusion found in the example CoRE FGS specification [15] through
visualization of the automation and cockpit.
4.3.1 Rotation of the VS/Pitch Wheel
In [13], Leveson et. al., identify inputs that are interpreted differently in different modes as a
potential source of mode confusion. An example of this is the response of the system to a
rotation of the VS/Pitch Wheel. When the active vertical mode is PITCH or VS, rotating the
VS/Pitch Wheel on the flight control panel will not cause a mode change (see Figure 13).
However, rotating the wheel when ALTHOLD is active will cause PITCH to become active, and
ALTHOLD to clear (see Figure 14). Thus, in one mode, turning the VS/Pitch Wheel causes a
mode change, while in another, it does not.
There are obvious reasons why rotating the VS/Pitch Wheel should not cause a mode change in
PITCH or VS mode. While in PITCH mode, rotation of the wheel is used to change the pitch
reference (desired pitch angle) of the aircraft. In VS mode, the wheel is used to change the
vertical speed reference (desired vertical rate of ascent or descent). Using the same input device
for both purposes conserves the limited space of the flight deck. Whether this is a significant
source of mode confusion is a question that would need to be explored carefully by experts in
human factors and flight deck design. In the same way, it can be argued whether rotating the
VS/Pitch Wheel while in ALTHOLD mode should cause a mode change. It may be that this is an
intuitive way for the pilot to interact with the system and is not a source of confusion.
Vertical Modes
PITCH
VS
ALTHOLD
VS/P itch W heel turned
PITCH
VS
ALTHOLD
Vertical Modes
Figure 13 - Rotating the VS/Pitch Wheel Does Not Cause a Mode Change
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Vertical Modes
PITCH
VS
ALTHOLD
VS/P itch W heel turned
Vertical Modes
PITCH
VS
ALTHOLD
Figure 14 - Rotating the VS/Pitch Wheel Does Cause a Mode Change
4.3.2 Similar Annunciations
Another common source of mode confusion cited in [13] is lack of appropriate feedback. An
example of this is the similarity of annunciations for NAV and APPR mode (see Figure 15 and
Figure 16).
Figure 15 - NAV Mode Armed
Figure 16 - APPR Mode Armed
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Theonly differencein the CoREFGSmodel in annunciatingthesetwo modesarethe indicator
lights aroundthe NAV and APPR buttons.Oneway to resolvethis would be to add a GS
(glideslope)annunciationin the vertical armedfield when lateral APPR mode is armed.The
CoREFGSmodeldid not specifythis sincethe vertical APPRmodedoesnot entertheArmed
stateuntil the lateralAPPRmodeenterstheTrack state(seeSection4.2).
4.3.3 Response to the FD Switch
A final example of a potential source of mode confusion is the response to the FD button. The
system interprets these differently depending on the current state of the system. When the
Autopilot is not engaged and an overspeed condition does not exist, the FD switch will toggle the
Flight Director between On and Off, removing both the mode annunciation and the guidance
cues. When the Autopilot is engaged or an overspeed condition exists, the FD switch toggles
between Cues-Off and Cues-On mode, removing the guidance cues but leaving the modes
annunciated (see Figure 17).
Again, there are good reasons for this behavior. If the Autopilot is engaged, the Flight Director
must be on since FAA regulations (and common sense) dictate that modes be annunciated when
the Autopilot is engaged. For similar reasons, the modes are annunciated during an overspeed
condition. Pressing the FD button while the Autopilot is engaged or an overspeed condition
exists serves to both de-clutter the display and provide feedback to the pilot that the button press
was recognized.
This example, as well as all those in this section, illustrate the need for potential sources of mode
confusion to be carefully evaluated on a case by case basis. Often, there are constraints or
conflicting requirements behind a particular design that are not readily apparent. Part of the
contribution of this approach is to show how a high-level, executable model and a few
inexpensive mock-ups can be used to detect potential sources of mode confusion and to facilitate
discussion of how they can be resolved by the system designers, pilots, and experts in human
factors.
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Autopilot Disengaged
Flight Director
Autopilot
FD
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Flight Director
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Flight Director
Autopilot
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Autopilot
FD
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Flight Director
Autopilot
Figure 17 - Behavior of the FD Switch
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Chapter 5
The Formal Model
The PVS specification of the mode logic follows the same architecture as was presented in
Figure 6. 3 The import hierarchy for the PVS specification is shown in Figure 18. There is a
theory Flight_Guidance that imports theories for Flight_Director, Lateral_
Guidance, and Vertical Guidance. Lateral Guidance imports theories for the
lateral modes and Vertical Guidance imports theories for the vertical modes. However,
many of the modes have identical state behavior and can be described by the same theory when
only the mode logic is consideredJ In the current FGS model, only three basic theories,
Simple_Guidance, Arming_Guidance, and Non-Arming_Guidance, were needed to
describe all the modes. The following sections describe the PVS specification starting with these
three theories and building to Flight_Guidance. Names taken from the PVS theories are
printed in italics.
J G[lig?tce J
I Flight I I _ateral I VerticalDirector Guidance Guidance
I I
  stem   mpleArm n  onArm n 
Guidance Guidance IlGuidance
Figure 18 - PVS Import Hierarchy
3 The PVS model completed in Phase I does not include all the modes shown in the visualization.
4If the this model were extended with additional information, e.g., the computation of the pitch or roll guidance
command generated by the mode, this would no longer be true and separate theories would need to be defined for
each mode. However, the common state behavior could still be shared among similar modes.
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5.1 System Events
Events of interest to the entire Flight Guidance System, such as pressing the HDG switch, are
defined in the theory System shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. This theory enumerates all the
system events and categorizes them according to which components of the Flight Guidance
System they may affect. To facilitate reasoning about each mode separately and to use a template
for defining similar modes, events are also defined locally within each component and a mapping
is provided from the system events to these local events. Examples of this are provided in the
following sections.
System: THEORY
BEGIN
% .........................................................................
% Events seen by the FGS
% .........................................................................
Event: TYPE = { HDG Switch Hit,
NAV--Switch--Hit,
NAV--Armed Long Enough,
NAV--Track--Cond_--Met_Event,
GA Switch--Hit,
VS--Pitch Wheel Changed,
VS--SwitcK Hit,--
AP_Engage_,
AP Disengaged,
FD--Switch Hit,
Overspeed_--Start,
Overspeed End,
SYNC SwitCh Pressed,
SYNC--Switch--Released }
% .........................................................................
% There are no events that directly affect the lateral ROLL mode.
% In this FGS, ROLL mode is the default lateral mode and is selected or
% cleared by changing the other lateral modes.
% .........................................................................
ROLL Event?(e:Event) : bool = False
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the lateral HDG mode.
% .........................................................................
HDG Event?(e:Event) : bool = HDG Switch Hit?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the lateral NAV mode.
% .........................................................................
NAV Event?(e: Event) : bool = NAV Switch Hit?(e) OR
--NAV_Armed_Long_Enough? (e) OR NAV_Trac__Cond_Met_Event? (e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the lateral GA mode.
% .........................................................................
LGA Event?(e: Event) : bool = GA Switch Hit?(e) OR
--AP_Engaged?(e) OR SYNC_Switch_Pressed?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the active lateral mode.
% .........................................................................
Lateral Event?(e: Event) : bool =
ROLL Event?(e) OR HDG Event?(e) OR NAV Event?(e) OR LGA Event?(e)
Figure 19 - PVS Specification of System Events
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5.2 State Behavior of the Operational Modes
The state behavior of the operational modes are described by three theories,
Simple_Guidance, Arming_Guidance, and Non-Arming_Guidance. To provide a
consistentinterfaceto the Lateral Guidance and Vertical Guidance theories,allof
these theories are structured similarly and provide similar responses to certain events. For
example, the Activate event always takes a mode into an active state if it is in an inactive
state, otherwise it is ignored. The D e act i vat e event always takes a mode into an inactive state
if it is in an active state. The Switch event toggles a mode between active and inactive states,
acting like an Activate event in an inactive mode and a Deactivate event in an active
mode. Finally, the Cle a r event places the mode into the cleared state.
Each of the three theories contains a PVS record, State Vector, that contains the current
state of the mode and any additional state information associated with the mode. Since PVS does
not provide explicit state variables, the state information for each mode is maintained in a
State Vector record in either Lateral Guidance or Vertical Guidance. The
% Events directly affecting the vertical PITCH mode
% .........................................................................
PITCH_Event?(e: Event) : bool = VS_Pitch_Wheel_Changed?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the vertical SPEED mode
% .........................................................................
VS Event?(e: Event) : bool = VS Switch Hit?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the vertical GA mode.
% .........................................................................
VGA Event?(e: Event) : bool = GA Switch Hit?(e) OR
--AP_Engaged?(e) OR SYNC_Switch_Presse_?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events directly affecting the active vertical mode.
% .........................................................................
Vertical Event?(e: Event) : bool =
PITCH Event?(e) OR VS Event?(e) or VGA Event?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Lateral mode requests than can turn on the Flight Director
% .........................................................................
Lateral Mode Requested?(e: Event) : bool =
HDG Switch--Hit?(e) OR NAV Switch Hit?(e) OR GA Switch Hit?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Vertical mode requests that can turn on the Flight Director
% .........................................................................
Vertical Mode Requested?(e: Event) : bool =
VS Switch HTt?(e) OR GA Switch Hit?(e)
% .........................................................................
% Events that affect the Flight Director
% .........................................................................
Flight Director Event?(e: Event) : bool =
AP_mngaged_ (e ) OR
FD Switch Hit?(e) OR
Overspeed--Start?(e) OR
Lateral Mode Requested?(e) OR
VerticaT_Mode_Requested?(e)
END System
Figure 20 - PVS Specification of System Events (Continued)
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State Vector records for Lateral Guidance and Vertical Guidance are in turn
maintained in a State_Vector record in FlightGuidance. While the intent is that the
state information for a mode is encapsulated within the theory for that mode and is not directly
manipulated by other theories, this is enforced only by convention.
Each mode theory also provides a function, next s t at e, that takes the current state of a mode
and an event and returns the next state and a set of internal events, or signals, that need to be
acted on by other components. For example, if a mode becomes active, the next state
function returns both the new state and the Activated signal. This signal is used by either
Lateral Guidance or Vertical Guidance to ensure that the current active mode is
cleared. Finally, each theory provides a predicate Active? that takes the current state of the
mode and returns true if the mode is active.
5.2.1 Simple Guidance
The state behavior for Simple_Guidance is depicted in Figure 21. As its name implies,
modes exhibiting this behavior only have two states, CLEARED and ACTIVE, and a handful of
transitions between them. Since these modes are so simple, the Clear and Deactivate
events cause identical state changes. Both events are defined in order to provide an interface
consistent with those of other modes.
CLEARED
Activate --tIP
Switch --tIP
Clear
Switch
Deactivate
ACTIVE
Figure 21 - State Behavior for Simple Guidance
The PVS specification Simple_Guidance is shown in Figure 22. The two states for the
mode are defined as a PVS enumeration type. For modes that can be described by
Simple_Guidance, the State_Vector record only contains the current state of the mode.
The mode is Act ire ? if the value of this field is ACT IVE.
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To facilitate using Simple_Guidance as a template for several modes, the events that cause
state transitions in Simple_Guidance are listed here as the PVS enumeration type Event.
The external system events listed in Figure 19 and Figure 20 are mapped into these events in the
Lateral Guidance and Vertical Guidance theories. The internal events, or signals,
that may be raised in Simple_Guidance are defined as the enumeration type Signal. The
next_state function defines how a Simple_Guidance mode responds to each event by
returning the new state and the set of signals raised for synchronization with the other modes. If
no further synchronization is necessary, a single Null ? signal is returned.
IF CLEARED?(state(s)) THEN
COND
Activate?(e) -> ((# state := ACTIVE #)
Switch?(e) -> ((# state := ACTIVE #)
Clear?(e) -> ( s,
Deactivate?(e) -> ( s,
ENDCOND
ELSE % IF ACTIVE?(s) THEN
COND
Deactivate?(e) -> ((# state := CLEARED #)
Switch?(e) -> ((# state := CLEARED #)
Clear?(e) -> ((# state := CLEARED #)
Activate?(e) -> ( s,
ENDCOND
ENDIF
END Simple Guidance
Activated?),
Activated?),
Null?),
Null?)
Deactivated?),
Deactivated?),
Deactivated?),
Null?)
Figure 22 - PVS Specification of Simple Guidance
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5.2.2 Arming Guidance
The state behavior for Arming_Guidance is depicted in Figure 23. Arming_Guidance
extends the behavior of Simple_Guidance by adding sub-statesARMED and TRACK of the
ACTIVE state,and sub-statesARMED INITIAL and ARMED LONG ENOUGH of the ARMED
state. Arming_Guidance modes are those in which the system can be armed pending the
capture of a navigation source, but is also active and generating guidance commands while
armed. For example, the lateral navigation (LNAV) mode can generate lateral guidance
commands to fly a specific heading while armed for the capture of a navigation source such as a
VOR. In TRACK mode, the navigation source has been captured and the mode is generating
guidance commands to track that source. The sub-states ARMED INITIAL and ARMED LONG
ENOUGH are used to ensure that the system remains in the ARMED mode a minimum period of
time even if the conditions for capturing the navigation source are satisfied on entry to the
ARMED mode.
Active
H
/f 4\\
Activate
Cleared
Switch
Clear
SwitchDeactivate \
Armed
Armed /
Armed Long
Initial Enough
Track
-< j
Figure 23 - State Behavior for Arming Guidance
The PVS specification for Arming_Guidance is given in Figure 24. The enumeration of
states is extended to include ARMED INITIAL, ARMED LONG ENOUGH, and TRACK. The
ARMED and ACTIVE states are defined as predicates over these base states. The
State Vector contains the current state of the mode and a boolean, Track Cond Met?,
that indicates whether the conditions for capture of the navigation source are met. The list of
events are extended to include the event Track Cond Met that occurs when the condition for
capture of the navigation source are met and the event Armed_Long_Enough that occurs
when the state has been ARMED for the minimum acceptable amount of time. Finally, the
next state function defines the new state created and signals raised by processing an event.
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Arming Guidance: THEORY
BEGIN
.........................................................................
% Mode States
.........................................................................
State: TYPE = {CLEARED, ARMED_INITIAL, ARMED_LONG_ENOUGH, TRACK}
ARMED?(s: State) : bool = ARMED INITIAL?(s) OR ARMED LONG ENOUGH?(s)
ACTIVE?(s: State) : bool = ARMED?(s) OR TRACK?(s)
.........................................................................
% State vector
.........................................................................
State Vector: TYPE = [# state: State,
Track Cond Met? : bool #]
.........................................................................
% Useful Definitions
.........................................................................
Active?(s: State_Vector) : bool = ACTIVE? (state(s))
.........................................................................
% Incoming Events and Outgoing Signals
.........................................................................
Event: TYPE = {Activate, Clear, Switch, Deactivate,
Track_Cond_Met, Armed_Long_Enough}
Signal: TYPE = {Null, Activated, Deactivated}
.........................................................................
% Next state function
.........................................................................
next state(s: State Vector, e: Event ) : [State Vector, set[Signal] ] =
IF CLEARED?(state(s)) THEN
COND
Activate?(e) -> (s WITH
Switch?(e) -> (s WITH
Clear?(e) -> (
Deactivate?(e) -> (
Track Cond Met?(e) -> (s WITH
Armed Long Enough?(e) -> (
ENDCOND
ELSE % IF ACTIVE?(state(s))
COND
Activate?(e) -> (
Switch?(e) -> (s WITH
Clear?(e) -> (s WITH
Deactivate?(e) -> (s WITH
Track Cond Met?(e) ->
IF ARMED LONG ENOUGH?(state(s))
THEN (s WITH
ELSE (s WITH
ENDIF,
Armed Long Enough?(e) ->
IF ARMED INITIAL?(state(s))
THEN (s WI
ELSIF ARMED INITIAL?(state(s))
THEN (s WITH
ELSE (
ENDIF
ENDCOND
ENDIF
END Arming Guidance
[state := ARMED INITIAL], Activated?),
[state := ARMED INITIAL], Activated?),
s, Null?),
s, Null?),
[Track Cond Met? := true],Null?),
s, Null?)
S,
[state := CLEARED],
[state := CLEARED],
[state := CLEARED],
Null?),
Deactivated?),
Deactivated?),
Deactivated?),
[state := TRACK,
Track Cond Met?
[Track Cond Met?
:= true] ,Null?)
:= true] ,Null?)
& Track Cond Met?(s)
TH [state := TRACK], Null?)
& NOT Track Cond Met?(s)
[state := ARMED LONG ENOUGH], Null?)
s, Null?)
Figure 24 - PVS Specification of Arming Guidance
5.3 Lateral Guidance
As discussed in Section 4.1, Lateral Guidance contains the lateral modes and maintains
any constraints between them. The PVS specification of Lateral Guidance is shown in
Figure 25 and Figure 26. The specification of the lateral modes of ROLL, HDG, and GA are
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created by importing the S imp i e_Guidan ce theory and assigning each mode an abbreviation.
The specification of lateral NAV mode is created by importing the Arming_Guidance theory
with an abbreviation. The State Vector for Lateral Guidance consists of the state
vectors for each of these modes.
The Clear_AllModes function is used by Flight_Guidance to clear (turn off) all
lateral modes when the Flight Director is turned off. It uses the next state function of each
mode to keep the PVS specification as close as possible to the ObjecTime model used for
visualization.
Lateral Guidance : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING System
ROLL: THEORY = Simple Guidance
HDG: THEORY = Simple--Guidance
NAV: THEORY = Arming_Guidance
GA: THEORY = Simple_Guidance
State Vector: TYPE = [# ROLL: ROLL.State Vector,
-- HDG: HDG.State Vector,
NAV: NAV.State--Vector,
GA: GA.State Vector #]
% ..........................................................................
% Clear all lateral modes
% ..........................................................................
Clear All Modes(s: State Vector): State Vector =
(#--ROLE := proj_l (next_state(ROLL(s)7 Clear)),
HDG := proj 1 (next state (HDG (s) , Clear) ) ,
NAV := proj--l(next--state(NAV(s) , Clear) ) ,
GA := proj_l(next_state(GA(s) , Clear) ) #)
% ..........................................................................
% Deactivate all lateral modes. Note that this function changes a mode
% only if it is active.
% ..........................................................................
Deactivate All Modes(s: State Vector) : State Vector =
(# ROLL--: = proj l(next state(ROLL(s), DeaCtivate)) ,
HDG := proj--i (next--state(HDG(s) , Deactivate) ) ,
NAV := proj_l(next--state_ (NAV(s) , Deactivate)) ,
GA := proj_l(next_state(GA(s) , Deactivate)) #)
% ..........................................................................
% Select (activate) the default mode
% ..........................................................................
Select Default Mode(s: State Vector): State Vector =
s WITH [ ROLE := proj_l(next_state(ROLL(sT, Activate)) ]
% ..........................................................................
% Map system HDG events onto the events of HDG theory
% ..........................................................................
HDG Event(e: (HDG Event?)) : HDG.Event =
COND
HDG Switch Hit?(e) -> HDG.Switch
ENDCOND
% ..........................................................................
% Map system NAV events onto the events of NAV theory
% ..........................................................................
NAV Event(e: (NAV Event?)) : NAV.Event =
COND
NAV Switch Hit?(e) -> NAV.Switch,
NAV--Track Cond Met Event?(e) -> NAV.Track Cond Met,
NAV_--Armed_--Long_Enough?(e) -> NAV.Armed_Long_Enough
ENDCOND
Figure 25 - PVS Specification of Lateral Guidance
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The Deactivate All Modes functionisused by Lateral Guidance to ensure thatat
most one lateral mode is ever active. This function changes the state of a mode only if the mode
is active. The Select Default Mode function is used by Lateral Guidance to
activate the default mode when the current active lateral mode is deactivated and by
Flight_Guidance to activate the default mode when the Flight_Director is turned on
without the selection of a specific lateral mode.
% ..........................................................................
% Map system LGA events onto the events of GA theory
% ..........................................................................
GA Event(e: (LGA Event?)) : GA.Event =
--COND
GA Switch Hit?(e) -> GA.Activate,
AP--Engaged?(e) -> GA.Clear,
SYNC Switch Pressed?(e) -> GA.Clear
ENDCOND
Signal: TYPE = {Null}
% ..........................................................................
% Process the next event
% ..........................................................................
next state(s:State_Vector, e:System. Event): [State_Vector, set[Signal] ] =
CON_
% ........................................................................
HDG Event?(e) ->
%----_ .....................................................................
LET (newHDG, signals) = next state(HDG(s) , HDG Event(e))
IN IF signals(Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes(s) WITH [HDG := newHDG], Null?)
ELSIF signals(Deac[ivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [HDG := newHDG]) , Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [HDG := newHDG], Null?)
ENDIF,
% ........................................................................
NAV Event? (e) ->
%----_ .....................................................................
Let (newNAV, signals) = next state(NAV(s) , NAV Event(e))
IN IF signals(Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes(s) WITH [NAV := newNAV], Null?)
ELSIF signals(Deac[ivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [NAV := newNAV]), Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [NAV := newNAV], Null?)
ENDIF,
% ........................................................................
LGA Event? (e) ->
%----_ .....................................................................
LET (newGA, signals) = next state(GA(s) , GA Event (e))
IN IF signals (Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes(s) WITH [GA := newGA], Null?)
ELSIF signals(Deac[ivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [GA := newGA ]) , Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [GA := newGA], Null?)
ENDIF,
ELSE -> (s, Null?)
ENDCOND
END Lateral Guidance
Figure 26 - PVS Specification of Lateral Guidance (Continued)
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The system level events defined in theory System (Figure 19 and Figure 20) are mapped into
the internal events of Simple_Guidance and Arming_Guidance by the functions HDG_
Event, NAV Event, and GA Event. For example, GA Event maps the system event
AP Engaged into the SimpleGuidance event Clear for theory GA.
The next state function for Lateral Guidance takes a state vector for
Lateral Guidance and a system event and returns the new state vector and a set of signals
raised. Since the system events have been categorized by the modes of the FGS they affect, the
next state function first determines if the event could affect a particular mode, then
computes the new state of the mode, then synchronizes any changes in the state of the mode with
the other lateral modes. For example, if the event is a HDG Event, the next state function
first computes the next state of the HD G component (recall that the S imp i e_Gu i dan c e theory
used to create the HDG theory also has a next state function). If the Activate signal was
raised, indicating that the HDG mode has become active as a result of the event, then all modes in
the lateral guidance state vector are deactivated and the new active HDG mode is installed in the
state vector. In like fashion, if the Deactivate signal was raised, indicating that the HDG
mode has become inactive, then the new inactive HDG mode is installed in the state vector and
the default mode is selected (activated). If no signals were raised, no synchronization with the
other modes are necessary and the new HDG mode is simply installed in the
Lateral Guidance state vector. Finally, note that if the event does not affect any lateral
modes, the original state vector and the null signal are returned.
5.4 Vertical Guidance
Vertical Guidance plays the same role for the vertical modes that Lateral Guidance
does for the lateral modes. The PVS specification for Vertical Guidance is shown in
Figure 27 and Figure 28. The specification of the vertical modes of PITCH, VS, and GA are
created by importing the S imple_Guidan ce theory and assigning each mode an abbreviation.
The State Vector for Vertical Guidance consists of the state vectors for each of these
modes.
The Clear All Modes, Deactivate All Modes, and Select Default Mode
functions sere _e same functions as in Lateral Guidance, but _r _e ve_cal modes. The
default vertical mode is PITCH. The next state function is also similar to _ _r
Lateral Guidance
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Vertical Guidance: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING System
PITCH: THEORY = Simple_Guidance
VS: THEORY = Simple Guidance
GA: THEORY = Simple,Guidance
State Vector: TYPE = [# PITCH : PITCH.State Vector,
-- VS : VS.State VeCtor,
GA : GA. State--Vector #]
..........................................................................
% Clear all vertical modes.
..........................................................................
Clear All Modes(s: State Vector): State Vector =
(#--PITCH := proj_l (neXt state (PITCH (3) , Clear) ) ,
VS := proj 1 (next--state(VS(s) , Clear)) ,
GA := proj_l (next_state(VS(s) , Clear)) #)
..........................................................................
% Deactivate all vertical modes. Note that this function changes a mode
% only if it is active.
..........................................................................
Deactivate All Modes(s: State Vector) : State Vector =
(# PITCH :=--proj_l (next state(PITCH(s) , Deactivate) ) ,
VS := proj 1 (next--state(VS(s) , Deactivate) ) ,
GA :: proj_l (next_state(GA(s) , Deactivate) ) #)
..........................................................................
% Select (activate) the default mode
..........................................................................
Select Default Mode(s: State Vector): State Vector =
s WITH [ PITCH := proj_l(next_state(PITCH_s), Activate)) ]
..........................................................................
% Map system PITCH events onto the events of PITCH theory
..........................................................................
PITCH Event(e: (PITCH_Event?)) : PITCH.Event =
COND
VS_Pitch_Wheel_Changed?(e) -> PITCH.Activate
ENDCOND
..........................................................................
% Map system VS events onto the events of VS theory
..........................................................................
VS Event(e: (VS_Event?)) : VS.Event =
--COND
VS Switch Hit?(e) -> VS.Switch
ENDCOND
..........................................................................
% Map system VGA events onto the events of GA theory
..........................................................................
GA Event(e: (VGA Event?)) : GA.Event =
--COND
GA Switch Hit?(e) -> GA.Switch,
AP--Engage_?(e) -> GA.Clear,
SYNC Switch Pressed?(e) -> GA.Clear
ENDCOND
Figure 27 - PVS Specification of Vertical Guidance
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Signal: TYPE = {Null}
..........................................................................
% Process the next event
.........................................................................
next state(s: State Vector, e: System. Event) :
[State_Vector, set [Signal] ] =
COND
........................................................................
PITCH Event?(e) ->
.... __ ...................................................................
LET (newPITCH, signals) = next_state (PITCH(s) , PITCH_Event (e))
IN IF signals (Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes (s) WITH [PITCH := newPITCH], Null?)
ELSIF signals(Deac[ivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [PITCH := newPITCH] ) , Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [PITCH := newPITCH], Null?)
ENDIF,
........................................................................
VS Event? (e) ->
____ ......................................................................
LET (newVS, signals) = next state (VS (s) , VS Event (e))
IN IF signals (Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes(s) WITH [VS := newVS], Null?)
ELSIF signals_Dea_tivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [VS := newVS]) , Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [VS := newVS], Null?)
ENDIF,
........................................................................
VGA Event? (e) ->
_____ .....................................................................
LET (newGA, signals) = next state(GA(s) , GA Event (e))
IN IF signals (Activated) THEN
(Deactivate All Modes (s) WITH [GA := newGA], Null?)
ELSIF signals(Deac[ivated) THEN
(Select Default Mode(s WITH [GA := newGA]), Null?)
ELSE
(s WITH [GA := newGA ], Null?)
ENDIF,
ELSE -> (s, Null?)
ENDCOND
END Vertical Guidance
Figure 28 - PVS Specification of Vertical Guidance (Continued)
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5.5 Flight Director
The Flight Director defines when the active and armed modes are annunciated and when the
guidance cues are displayed on the EFIS display. The state behavior of the Flight Director is
shown in Figure 29. The Flight Director has two main states, OFF and ON. When in the OFF
state, the active and armed lateral and vertical modes are not annunciated and the guidance cues
are not displayed on the EFIS. When in the ON state, the active and armed lateral and vertical
modes are always annunciated on the EFIS. The ON state has two sub-states, CUES OFF and
CUES ON, that determine if the guidance cues are displayed or not.
Off
Figure 29 - State Behavior for Flight Director
The PVS specification for the Flight_Director is shown in Figure 30. Events local to the
Flight_Director are those to Turn_On, Turn_Off, Force_Cues to force the
guidance cues to display,and Switch to togglethe Flight_Director on and off. The
Flight_Director returnstwo signals,Turned_On and Turned_Off, used to coordinate
with the rest of the Flight Guidance System. The State Vector consists simply of the Flight
Director's state. For convenience in the Flight_Guidance theory, the function On? is
defined here as an abbreviation.
The next_state function for the Flight_Director differs from the next state functions
encountered so far in that they include two additional boolean parameters, AP_Engage d ? and
Overspeed?. These are components of the Flight Guidance System state external to the
Flight_Director that affect its behavior. AP_Engaged? Indicates whether the Autopilot
is engaged. Overspeed? indicates if the airspeed of the aircraft exceeds its structural limits.
These are used as guards on some of the Flight_Director state transitions. In particular, if
the autopilot is engaged or the overspeed condition exists, the Flight_Director must be in
the ON state so that the lateral and vertical modes are annunciated.
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next state(s:State Vector, e:Event,
[State_Vector, set[Signal]] =
IF OFF?(state(s)) THEN
COND
Force Cues?(e) -> (s WITH [state
Turn On?(e) -> (s WITH [state
Swit_h?(e) -> (s WITH [state
Turn Off?(e) ->
ENDCOND
ELSIF CUES?(state(s)) THEN
COND
Force Cues?(e) ->
Turn On?(e) ->
Swit_h?(e) OR Turn_Off?(e) ->
IF (Overspeed? or AP_Engaged?) THEN
(s WITH [state
ELSE
(s WITH [state
ENDIF
ENDCOND
ELSE % IF NO CUES(state(s)) THEN
COND
Force Cues?(e) -> (s WITH [state
Turn On?(e) -> (s WITH [state
Swit_h?(e) ->
IF (Overspeed? or AP_Engaged?) THEN
(s WITH [state
ELSE
(s WITH [state
ENDIF,
Turn Off?(e) ->
IF--(Overspeed? or AP_Engaged?) THEN
(
ELSE
(s WITH [state
ENDIF
ENDCOND
ENDIF
END Flight_Director
AP_Engaged?:bool, Overspeed?:bool) :
:= CUES], Turned On?)
:= CUES], Turned--On?)
:= CUES], Turned--On?)
s, Null?)--
s, Null?),
s, Null?),
:: NO CUES], Null?)
:= OFF], Turned_Off?)
:: CUES]
:= CUES]
:: CUES]
Null?) ,
Null?) ,
Null?)
:= OFF], Turned_Off?)
s, Null?)
:= OFF], Turned_Off?)
Figure 30 - PVS Specification of Flight Director
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5.6 Flight Guidance
Flight_Guidance contains the Flight_Director, Lateral_Guidance, and
Vertical Guidance components. The PVS specification for this theory is shown in Figure
31. The State_Vector for the entire Flight_Guidance system consists of the State_
Vectors for these components and the AP_Enaged? And Overspeed? indicators provided
by sources external to the Flight Guidance System. Just as was done in Lateral Guidance
and Vertical Guidance, the FD Event function maps the system level events that can
affect the F 1 i ght _D i r e c t o r into the local events for that theory.
The next state function for the entire Flight Guidance System is defined in terms of three
auxiliaryfunctions,Process External Event, Process FD Event, and Process
Flight_Mode_Event. Each of thesetake a system event and a State_Vector and return
anewState Vector.
The Process External Event is the simplest of the three. It simply updates
AP_Engaged? and Overspeed? booleans if the system event indicates their status has
changed.
The Process_FD_Event function updates the Flight_Director component of the
system state if the event might affect it. It first determines the new state of the Flight_
Director. If the Flight_Director was Turned_Off, then the lateral and vertical modes
are cleared and the existing state is updated with the new state of the Flight_Director and
the cleared lateral and vertical modes. If the Flight_Director was Turned_On, then
default lateral and vertical modes are selected and the existing state is updated with the new state
of the Flight_Director and the lateral and vertical modes. If the Flight_Director was
neither Turned On or Turned Off by the event (for example, if the guidance cues were
simply turned off), then the existing state is updated with the new state of the Flight_
Director.
The Process_Flight_Modes_Event determines any changes caused in the lateral and
vertical modes by the event and installs the new modes in the State Vector. No change is
made if the F i i ght _D i r e c t o r is turned off.
The next state function takes a State Vector and a system event and returns the
next_state of Flight_Guidance. No signals are returned from the next_state
function as Flight_Guidance is the top most theory in the specification and there are no
sibling components to maintain synchronization with. It first computes any changes in the
AP_Engaged? and Overspeed? booleans, then computes any changes to the Flight_
Director, and finally computes any changes in the lateral and vertical modes. This tiered
strategy is necessary since an event may affect multiple components. For example, if the Flight
Director is off, pressing the HDG button will turn the Flight_Director on and select the
HDG lateral mode and the default vertical mode.
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Flight_Guidance : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Flight_Director, Lateral_Guidance, Vertical_Guidance
State Vector: TYPE = [# FD : Flight Director. State Vector,
-- LATERAL : LateraT Guidance. Stat[ Vector,
VERTICAL : VerticaT_Guidance. Stat[_Vector,
AP Engaged? : bool,
Overspeed? : bool #]
..........................................................................
% Map system Flight Director events to internal Flight Director events
..........................................................................
FD Event(e: (Flight_Director Event?)) : Flight_Director. Event =
--COND
AP Engaged?(e) -> Turn On,
Lateral Mode Requested?(e) -> Turn,On,
VerticaT Mod[ Requested?(e) -> Turn On,
FD Switc[ Hit_(e) -> SwitCh,
Ov[rspeed_--Start?(e) -> Force_Cues
ENDCOND
..........................................................................
% Process events that change state external to the FGS
..........................................................................
Process External Event(e: System. Event, s: State_Vector): State Vector =
COND-- --
AP Engaged?(e) -> s WITH [AP Engaged? := true ],
AP--Disengaged?(e) -> s WITH [AP--Engaged? := false],
Ov[rspeed Start?(e) -> s WITH [Overspeed? := true ],
Overspeed_--End?(e) -> s WITH [Overspeed? := false],
ELSE -> s
ENDCOND
..........................................................................
% Process a flight director event
..........................................................................
Process FD Event(e: System. Event, s: State_Vector): State_Vector =
IF Flight Director Event?(e) THEN
LET (newfd, signals) =
next state(FD(s), FD Event(e), AP_Engaged?(s) ,Overspeed?(s))
IN IF signals(Turned Off)--THEN
s WITH [FD := newfd,
LATERAL := Clear All Modes(LATERAL(s)),
VERTICAL := Clear--All--Modes(VERTiCAL(s))]
ELSIF signals(Turned_On) THEN --
s WITH [FD := newfd,
LATERAL := Select Default Mode(LATERAL(s)),
VERTICAL := Select--Default--Mode(VERTiCAL(s)) ]
ELSE
s WITH [FD := newfd]
ENDIF
ELSE
S
ENDIF
..........................................................................
% Process a lateral or vertical mode event.
..........................................................................
Process Flight Mode Event(e: System. Event, s: State_Vector) : State Vector =
IF On? (FD (sT) THEN
s WITH [LATERAL := proj_l(next state(LATERAL(s),e)),
VERTICAL := proj_l(next_state(VERTICAL(s) ,e)) ]
ELSE
S
ENDIF
..........................................................................
% Next state function
..........................................................................
next state(s: State Vector, e:System. Event): State Vector =
Process Flight mode Event(e,
Process FD EVent([,
Process External Event(e, s)))
Figure 31 - PVS Specification of Flight Guidance
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Chapter 6
Proofs of Properties
There are many useful properties of the formal model described in Chapter 5 that can be
demonstrated with the PVS prover. These include ensuring that important relationships between
the modes are maintained, that the system behaves as expected to system events, and even that
particular sources of mode confusion do not exist in the model. These proofs are described in this
chapter.
6.1 Proving Key Relationships Between the Modes
As discussed in Section 4.1, the architecture of the FGS was chosen to minimize maintenance
and support the development of a family of Flight Guidance Systems. This is achieved by
breaking the FGS into several small, cohesive components. A consequence of this is that there
are several important relationships that must be maintained between the modes. These include:
1. If the autopilot is engaged, the flight director is on.
2. If the flight director is on, one and only one lateral mode is active.
3. If the flight director is on, one and only one vertical mode is active.
4. If the flight director is off, all lateral and vertical modes are cleared.
These properties are stated in PVS in the theory Flight_Guidance_Properties shown in
Figure 33. All of them are shown by induction over the reachable states. That is, for an arbitrary
state s and system event e, it is shown that if the property holds for state s, it also holds for the
state next state (s, e). Since these properties are trivially true of the initial system state,
they must hold for all states reachable from the initial state.
For example, property 1 that the flight director must be on if the autopilot is engaged is the first
property proven. To simplify stating the desired property, the auxiliary function
FD On If AP Engaged is first defined and used in the lemma FDOIFAPE (Flight Director
On IF AutoPilot Engaged), which states that if FD On If AP Engaged is true of state s, it
also true of state next state (s, e). This lemma is proved by the simple PVS proof shown
in Figure 32.
l, l,
(SKOS IMP* )
(LEMMA "System. Event inclusive")
(INST?)
(APPLY (THEN (SPLIT -i) (GRIND))))
Figure 32 - Proof of Lemma FDOIFAPE
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Flight_Guidance_Properties: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Flight Guidance,
LateraT Guidance Properties,
VerticaT_Guidance_Properties
s: VAR Flight_Guidance. State_Vector
e: VAR System. Event
..........................................................................
% The Flight Director is on if the Autopilot is Engaged
..........................................................................
FD On If AP Engaged(s): bool =
AP_Engaged?(s) => On?(FD(s))
FDOIFAPE: LEMMA
FD On If AP Engaged(s) => FD On If AP Engaged(next state(s,e))
..........................................................................
% At least one lateral mode is active iff the Flight Director is ON
..........................................................................
At Least One Lateral Mode Active(s) : bool =
--On?(FD(s)T <=> At--Least One Mode Active(LATERAL(s))
ALOLMA: LEMMA
At Least One Lateral Mode Active(s) =>
--At Least One LateTal Mode Active(next state(s,e))
..........................................................................
% There is never more than one lateral mode active.
..........................................................................
At Most One Lateral Mode Active(s): bool =
--At MUst One Mode-ActiVe(LATERAL(s))
AMOLMA: LEMMA
At Least One Lateral Mode Active(s) &
At Mos[ On[ LateraT Mode Active(s) =>
At Most One Lateral Mo_e Active(next state(s,e))
..........................................................................
% At least one vertical mode is active iff the Flight Director is ON
..........................................................................
At Least One Vertical Mode Active(s): bool =
--On?(FD(s)T <=> At Least--One Mode Active(VERTICAL(s))
ALOVMA : LEMMA
At Least One Vertical Mode Active(s) =>
-At_Least_One_Verti_al_Mode_Active(next_state(s,e))
..........................................................................
% At most one vertical mode is active iff the Flight Director is ON
..........................................................................
At Most One Vertical Mode Active(s) : bool =
--At MUst One Mode Activ[(VERTICAL(s))
AMOVMA: LEMMA
At Least One Vertical Mode Active(s) &
At Mos[ On[ VerticaT Mod[ Active(s) =>
At_Most_One_Vertical_Mo_e_Active(next_state(s,e))
..........................................................................
% A valid state is one in which the Flight Director is on if the Autopilot
% is engaged and exactly one lateral mode and one vertical mode are
% active iff the Flight Director is on.
..........................................................................
Valid State(s) : bool =
FD--On If AP Engaged(s) &
At Least One Lateral Mode Active(s) &
At--Most One Lateral Mode Active(s) &
At--Leas[ On[ Vertical Mode Active(s) &
At--Most One Vertical Mode Active(s)
VS: LEMMA
Valid State(s) => Valid State(next state(s,e))
END Flight_Guidance_Properties
Figure 33 - Flight Guidance Properties
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Properties 2, 3, and 4 are shown by proving lemmas ALOLMA (At Least One Lateral Mode
Active), AMOLMA (At Most One Lateral Mode Active), ALOVMA (At Least One Vertical Mode
Active), and AMOVMA (At Most One Vertical Mode Active). These make use of the auxiliary
functions in theories Lateral_Guidance_Properties and Vertical_Guidance_
Properties (shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35) that define what it means for at least and at
most lateral or vertical mode to be active.
The proof of ALOLMA makes use of the auxiliary predicate At Least One Lateral
Mode Active, which is true when either the flight director is off or at least one lateral mode is
active. The desired property is then stated as an inductive proof over the reachable states.
The proof of AMOLMA also makes use of an auxiliary predicate At Most One Lateral
Mode Active, which is true if no more than one lateral mode is active. The proof of
AMOLMA also requires that the predicate At Least One Lateral Mode Active holds
for state s to eliminate the configurations where the flight director is off and a lateral mode is
active. This poses no problems as this predicate was shown to hold for all reachable states in the
proof of ALOLMA.
The lemmas ALOVMA and AMOVMA for the vertical modes are similar to those for the lateral
modes. Interestingly, the proofs for all four lemmas (AL©LMA, AM©LMA, AL©VMA, and
AMOVMA) are identical to those for FDOIFAPE shown in Figure 32.
Lateral_Guidance_Properties : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Lateral Guidance
s: VAR Lateral Guidance. State Vector
e: VAR (LateraT Event?)
..........................................................................
% Definition of at least one lateral mode active
..........................................................................
At Least One Mode Active(s) : bool =
--Active? (ROLL (sT) OR
Active?(HDG(s) ) OR
Active? (NAV(s)) OR
Active? (GA (s))
...........................................................................
% Definition of at most one lateral mode active
...........................................................................
At Most One Mode Active(s) : bool =
-- LET--R =--ActiVe? (ROLL(s)) , H = Active?(HDG(s) ) ,
N = Active?(NAV(s) ) , G = Active?(GA(s) ) IN
(R => NOT H & NOT N & NOT G) &
(H => NOT R & NOT N & NOT G) &
(N => NOT R & NOT H & NOT G) &
(G => NOT R & NOT H & NOT N )
END Lateral_Guidance_Properties
Figure 34 - Lateral Guidance Properties
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Finally, thesepropertiesarecombinedin the definition of a Valid State, i.e., a state in
which all of these properties hold. Lemma vs asserts that if Valid State holds in state s, it
also holds in state next state (s, e). The proof of vs makes direct use of the proofs of
lemmas FDOIFAPE, ALOLMA, AMOLMA, ALOVMA, and AMOVMA.
6.2 Regression Analysis
The modular architecture of the FGS facilitates incremental development of the PVS
specification by adding new modes to the existing framework. This was precisely the pattern we
followed in developing both the ObjecTime and PVS models. While it was straightforward to
specify the behavior of a single mode such as ROLL or GA, we found ourselves making small
mistakes when modifying the Lateral_Guidance, Vertical_Guidance, or Flight_
Guidance theories to include these new modes. As a result, we started developing simple
putative lemmas that described the response of the FGS to each new system event. A few of
these are shown in Figure 36.
Most of these could be proved with a single PVS (GRIND) command. While not technically
deep or challenging, they were very useful for checking that an error had not been introduced in
an already completed portion of the model. This process was very similar to regression testing,
except that instead of running test cases after each change, we ran the proofs of these lemmas.
Vertical_Guidance_Properties : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Vertical Guidance
s: VAR Vertical Guidance. State Vector
e: VAR (VerticaT Event?)
% ..........................................................................
% Definition of at least one vertical mode active
% ..........................................................................
At Least One Mode Active(s) : bool =
--Active? (PTTCH (3)) OR
Active? (VS (s)) OR
Active? (GA (s))
% ..........................................................................
% Definition of at most one vertical mode active
% ..........................................................................
At Most One Mode Active(s): bool =
--LET P = Active?(PITCH(s)), V = Active?(VS(s)), G = Active?(GA(s)) IN
(P => NOT V & NOT G) &
(V => NOT P & NOT G) &
(G => NOT P & NOT V )
END Vertical_Guidance_Properties
Figure 35 - Vertical Guidance Properties
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Flight_Guidance_Checks : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Flight_Guidance_Properties
s: VAR Flight_Guidance. State_Vector
e: VAR System. Event
..........................................................................
% Check for correct response to pressing HDG button.
..........................................................................
HDG Selected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
NOT--ACTIVE? (state (HDG (LATERAL (s) ) ) ) & HDG Switch Hit? (e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (HDG (LATERAL (next_state (3, e) ) ) )T
HDG Deselected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
ACTTVE? (state (HDG (LATERAL (s) ) ) ) & HDG Switch Hit? (e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (ROLL (LATERAL (next state(s,e)T) ) )
..........................................................................
% Check for correct response to pressing NAV button.
..........................................................................
NAV Selected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
NOT--ACTIVE? (state(NAV(LATERAL(s)))) & NAV Switch Hit?(e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (NAV (LATERAL (next_state (3, e) ) ) )_
NAV Deselected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
ACTTVE?(state(NAV(LATERAL(s)) )) & NAV Switch Hit?(e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (ROLL (LATERAL (next state(s,e)T) ) )
% Check for correct response to pressing VS button.
..........................................................................
VS Selected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
NOT--ACTIVE? (state(VS(VERTICAL(s)))) & VS Switch Hit?(e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (VS (VERTICAL (next_state_s, e) ) )T)
VS Deselected: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
ACTTVE?(state(VS(VERTICAL(s)) )) & VS Switch Hit?(e) =>
ACTIVE? (state (PITCH (VERTICAL (next state(s_e)) )) )
..........................................................................
% Check for correct response to pressing the FD button.
..........................................................................
FD OFF: LEMMA
--OFF?(state(FD(s))) & FD Switch Hit?(e) =>
CUES? (state (FD (next state(s_e) ) ) )
FD ON: LEMMA
--ON?(state(FD(s))) & FD Switch Hit?(e) &
NOT (AP Engaged?(s)--OR OveTspeed? (s) =>
OFF,(state (FD (next_state (s, e) ) ) )
FD CUES : LEMMA
--CUES?(state(FD(s))) & FD Switch Hit?(e) &
(AP Engaged? (s) OR Overspeed_(s) ) =>
NO CUES? (state (FD (next state(s,e) ))
FD NO CUES: LEMMA
NO CUES?(state(FD(s))) & FD Switch Hit?(e) &
--(AP_Engaged?(s) OR Overspeed? (sT) :>
CUES? (state (FD (next state(s,e) ) ) )
END Flight_Guidance_Checks
Figure 36 - Checks of FGS Response to System Events
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6.3 Searching for Sources of Mode Confusion
As discussed in Section 2.1, Leveson, et.al. [13], identify six categories of design that have
historically been sources of mode confusion:
1. Interface interpretation errors
2. Inconsistent behavior
3. Indirect mode changes
4. Operator authority limits
5. Unintended side effects
6. Lack of appropriate feedback
To the extent that these can be expressed formally, automated tools can be used to systematically
determine if such sources of mode confusion exist in our models. While much work remains to
be done in this area, this section demonstrates this concept with a few examples. The purpose of
this section is only to show how automated analysis can be used to discover potential sources of
mode confusion. Once such examples are discovered, there still needs to be a careful review of
their potential for mode confusion.
6.3.1 Inconsistent Behavior
Precisely defining the concept of inconsistent behavior is nontrivial and likely to be a long term
endeavor. However, examples of inconsistent behavior can easily be specified formally and
verified. For example, in Section 4.2 it was shown that many of the switches in the FGS act as
toggles, switching a mode between its CLEARED and ACTIVE states. But do the switches act
as toggles in all possible states? This question can be answered by proving a few simple lemmas
about each switch. For example, to assert that the HDG switch behaves as a toggle, we create the
lemmas
HDG_Toggle_l : LEMMA
NOT Active? (HDG (LATERAL (s)) ) =>
Active? (HDG (LATERAL (next state (s, HDG Switch Hit))))
HDG_Toggle_2 : LEMMA
Active? (HDG (LATERAL (s)) ) =>
NOT Active? (HDG (LATERAL (next state (s, HDG Switch Hit))))
Each of these are easily proved with a single PVS Grind command. Similar lemmas are shown
for the other switches in theory Consistent Behavior Checks (Figure 37). While the
HDG, NAV, and VS switches always behave as toggles in the current model, this will not hold
as the model is expanded to include more modes. For example, in the CoRE FGS specification
[15] the VS switch is inhibited when in the Track state of Vertical Approach mode. When
Vertical Approach is added to the PVS model, the lemmas about the affected switches will need
to be changed to describe their new behavior. However, these lemmas serve as quick and easy
check on the model as new modes are incorporated.
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Consistent Behavior Checks: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Flight_Guidance_Properties
s: VAR Flight_Guidance. State_Vector
e: VAR System. Event
% ..........................................................................
% Lemmas used to check that switches always act as toggles
% ..........................................................................
HDG Toggle i: LEMMA
NOT ActTve?(HDG(LATERAL
Active?(HDG(LATERAL
HDG_Toggle 2: LEMMA
ActTve?(HDG(LATERAL
NOT Active?(HDG(LATERAL
NAV Toggle i: LEMMA
NOT ActTve?(NAV(LATERAL
Active?(NAV(LATERAL
NAV_Toggle 2: LEMMA
ActTve?(NAV(LATERAL
NOT Active?(NAV(LATERAL
VS_Toggle i: LEMMA
NOT Ac_ive?(VS(VERTICAL
Active?(VS(VERTICAL
VS_Toggle 2: LEMMA
Ac_ive?(VS(VERTICAL
NOT Active?(VS(VERTICAL
END Consistent Behavior Checks
s))) :>
next state s HDG Switch Hit))
s))) :>
next state s HDG Switch Hit))
s))) :>
next state s NAV Switch Hit))
s))) :>
next state s NAV Switch Hit))
s))) :>
next state s VS_Switch_Hit)))
s))) :>
next state s VS_Switch_Hit)))
Figure 37 - Consistent Behavior Checks
Also note that the GA switch is not included in this list. The GA switch, which is mounted on the
Control Yoke rather than the Flight Control Panel, behaves differently from the other switches in
that it only selects Go Around mode. To deselect Go Around mode, the pilot must select another
mode, press the SYNC button, or engage the Autopilot.
6.3.2 Ignored Crew Inputs
Direct inputs from the flight crew that are ignored by the automation in some states are likely to
be potential sources of mode confusion. Unfortunately, it can be very difficult to determine all
the cases in which a crew input is ignored. However, if these concepts can be formalized, the
conditions under which a crew input is ignored can easily be found using our model.
To do this, we first define the concept of a crew input. A list of events that meet our informal
notion of a crew input are easily identified by scanning the list of system events. These are
enumerated by defining a predicate Crew_Input ? over the system events. This predicate is
shown in theory Ignored_Crew_Inputs in Figure 38. Next, we define what is means for a
crew input to be ignored. For this example, we define this as the failure of an event to cause a
mode change. The predicate Mode_Change ?, shown in theory Ignored_Crew_Inputs in
Figure 38, defines a mode change as change in state of the Flight Director or one of the lateral or
vertical modes.
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Ignored_Crew_Inputs: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Flight_Guidance_Properties
s: VAR Flight_Guidance. State_Vector
e: VAR System. Event
..........................................................................
% Events directly initiated by the flight crew
..........................................................................
Crew_Input?(e: System. Event) : bool =
AP Engaged?(e) OR
SYNC Switch Pressed? (e) OR
SYNC--Swit ch--Re leas ed ? (e) OR
FD SWitch HTt?(e) OR
LaTeral Mode Requested?(e) OR
VerticaT Mode Requested?(e) OR
VS_Pitch_WheeT_Changed?(e)
..........................................................................
% A mode change occurs when the state of the autopilot, flight director,
% or any lateral or vertical mode changes.
..........................................................................
Mode Change?(s,e) : bool =
state (FD (s))
state (ROLL (LATERAL (s)) )
state (HDG (LATERAL (s) )
state (NAV (LATERAL (s) )
state (GA (LATERAL (s))
state (PITCH (VERTICAL s) ) )
state (VS (VERTICAL (s) )
state (GA (VERTICAL (s) )
/= state (FD (next state(s,e) ) ) OR
/= state(ROLL(LATERAL(next state(s,e) ) ) ) OR
/= state(HDG(LATERAL(next state(s,e) ) ) ) OR
/= state (NAV (LATERAL (next--state (s, e) ) ) ) OR
/= state (GA (LATERAL (next state(s,e) ) ) ) OR
/= state(PITCH(VERTICAL(next state(s,e) ) ) ) OR
/= state(VS (VERTICAL (next state(s,e) ) ) ) OR
/= state (GA (VERTICAL (next--state (s, e) ) ) )
% Lemma used to search for ignored crew inputs
..........................................................................
Search For Ignored Crew Inputs: LEMMA
ValTd_STate(s) & Crew_Input?(e) => Mode_Change?(s,e)
..........................................................................
% Crew inputs that do not cause a mode change.
% o Engaging the Autopilot when not in Go Around mode
% o Pressing the GA Switch when in Go Around mode
% o Pressing the SYNC switch when not in Go Around mode
% o Releasing the SYNC switch
% o Rotating the Vertical Speed/Pitch Wheel when Flight Director is off
% o Rotating the Vertical Speed/Pitch Wheel when in Pitch mode
..........................................................................
Ignored Crew Input?(s,e) : bool =
AP--Engaged?(e) &
NOT (Active? (GA(LATERAL(s)) ) or Active?(GA(VERTICAL(s) ) ) ) OR
GA Switch Hit?(e) &
-- (AcTive? (GA(LATERAL(s)) ) & Active?(GA(VERTICAL(s) ) ) ) OR
SYNC Switch Pressed? (e) &
NOT (ActiVe?(GA(LATERAL(s))) or Active?(GA(VERTICAL(s)))) OR
SYNC Switch Pressed? (e) & NOT (On?(FD(s)) ) OR
SYNC--Swit ch--Re leas ed ? (e) OR
VS PTtch Wheel Changed?(e) & NOT (On?(FD(s))) OR
VS--Pitch--Wheel--Changed?(e) &
--(ActiVe? (PITCH (VERTICAL (s)) ) )
% ..........................................................................
% Lemma used to confirm that all ignored crew inputs are known
% ..........................................................................
No Known Ignored Crew_Inputs: LEMMA
--Valid--State(sT &
Crew Input?(e) &
NOT Ignored_Crew_Input?(s,e) => Mode_Change?(s,e)
END Ignored_Crew_Inputs
Figure 38 - Ignored Crew Inputs
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To search for crew inputs that are ignored, we assert the (false) lemma
Search_For_Ignored_Crew_Inputs : LEMMA
Valid_State(s) & Crew_Input? (e) => Mode_Change? (s,e)
and try to prove it with the PVS prover. This results in several proof sequents (e.g., proof
obligations) such as
{-i} VS Pitch_Wheel_Changed? (e! i)
[-2] Va_id State (s! i)
i
{i} CUES? (state (FD (s ! i) ) )
{2} NO CUES? (state (FD (s ! i) ) )
The antecedents {-i } and {-2} are the assertions known to be true at this point in the proof. To
complete this sequent, we have to show that either of the consequents {1 } or {2 } follow from the
antecedents. That is, given that the event e! 1 is that the VS/Pitch Wheel was rotated, and that we
start in a valid state s!l, we must prove that the Flight Director was in the state CUES or NO
CUES prior to rotating the VS/Pitch Wheel. Since our model provides no such constraint
between the state of the Flight Director and our ability to rotate the VS/Pitch Wheel, this cannot
be proven.
At this point, we realize that the reason PVS is requiring us to prove the impossible is because
our original lemma was false. If the FD is in the state OFF, rotation of the VS/Pitch Wheel does
not cause a mode change in the FGS. In other words, we have found a case where a crew input
does not cause a mode change. Examination of the other sequents generated by PVS leads the
following list of seven crew inputs that are ignored by the FGS: 5
1. The Autopilot is engaged while not in lateral or vertical Go Around mode
2. The GA switch is pressed while in lateral and vertical Go Around mode
3. The SYNC switch is pressed while not in lateral or vertical Go Around mode
4. The SYNC switch is pressed while the Flight Director is turned off
5. The SYNC switch is released
6. The VS/Pitch Wheel is rotated while the Flight Director is turned off
7. The VS/Pitch Wheel is rotated while in Pitch mode
5 The astute reader will note that rotation of the VS/Pitch Wheel while in VS mode is not included in the list. At the
end of Phase I, this scenario causes a mode change to PITCH in the PVS model. The necessary constraint will be
added in Phase II of the project.
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To avoidhaving to reexaminethis list of sequentseachtime the model is changed,wedefinea
predicateIgnored_Crew_Inputs? (shownin Figure 38) that enumerateseach of these
cases.Wethencreatethelemma
No_Known_Ignored_Crew_Inputs: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
Crew_Input?(e) &
NOT Ignored_Crew_Input?(s,e) => Mode_Change? (s, e)
that takes this list of known ignored crew inputs into account. As expected, the proof of this
lemma completes (in a little over a minute).
Trying to prove a lemma suspected to be false has allowed us to generate an explicit list of
ignored crew inputs. Used in this way, PVS becomes a tool of discovery rather than verification.
Moreover, the final proof can be rerun each time the PVS model of the mode logic is changed to
ensure no additional ignored crew inputs are created.
6.3.3 Indirect Mode Changes
Another common source of mode confusion identified in [13] is indirect mode changes. Indirect
mode changes occur when the system changes mode without a direct input from the operator.
While indirect mode changes are usually evident by inspection, the same technique used in the
previous section to detect ignored user inputs can be used to detect indirect mode changes. In this
case the lemma that we need to try to prove is
Search_For_Indirect_Mode_Changes : LEMMA
Valid_State (s) & NOT Crew_Input? (e) => NOT Mode_Change? (s, e)
This lemma states that all events that are not crew inputs, i.e., that are not direct inputs from the
operator, do not cause a mode change. Clearly, the exceptions to this lemma will be indirect
mode changes. Attempting to prove this lemma yields several unprovable sequents, just as in
Section 6.3.2. Examination of these leads to the following three sources of indirect mode
changes in the PVS model:
1. The overspeed condition becomes true while the Flight Director is turned off or is not
displaying the guidance cues
2. NAV mode remains Armed for the required minimum time
3. Navigation source is captured while in the Armed state of NAV mode
The first of indirect mode change forces the Flight Director to be turned on or display the
guidance cues when the overspeed condition occurs. The second causes a transition from the
ARMED INITIAL state of NAV mode to the ARMED LONG ENOUGH state of NAV mode. 6
6 This transition would be almost impossible for the flight crew to detect and probably should not even be
considered a mode change.
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Indirect_Mode_Changes: THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING Ignored_Crew_Inputs
s: VAR Flight_Guidance. State_Vector
e: VAR System. Event
..........................................................................
% Lemma used to search for indirect mode changes
..........................................................................
Search For Indirect Mode Changes: LEMMA
ValTd_S[ate(s) &--NOT Crew_Input?(e) => NOT Mode_Change?(s,e)
..........................................................................
% The only mode changes not caused by crew inputs are
% o Overspeed while Flight Director off or not displaying guidance cues
% o NAV armed minimum reached while in NAV Armed Initial state
% o NAV track condition met while in NAV Armed Long Enough state
..........................................................................
Indirect Mode Change?(s,e) : bool =
OveTspeed Start?(e) &
NOT (CUES? (state (FD (s)) ) ) OR
NAV Armed Long Enough?(e) &
ARMED INITIAL? (state (NAV (LATERAL (s) ) )) OR
NAV TraCk Cond Met Event?(e) &
ARMED LONG ENOUGH? (state (NAV (LATERAL (s) ) ) )
..........................................................................
% Lemma used to ensure all indirect mode changes are known
..........................................................................
No Unknown Indirect Mode_Changes: LEMMA
--Valid State(s) &-
NUT Crew Input?(e) &
NOT Tndirect_Mode_Change?(s,e) => NOT Mode_Change?(s,e)
END Indirect_Mode_Changes
Figure 39 - Ignored Crew Inputs
The last would cause a change from the ARMED to TRACK state of NAV mode when the
navigation source is captured.
As was done for ignored crew inputs, we define a predicate that enumerates the indirect mode
changes and create a new lemma to be proven:
No_Unknown_Indirect_Mode_Changes: LEMMA
Valid State(s) &
NOT Crew_Input?(e) &
NOT Indirect_Mode_Change?(s,e) => NOT Mode_Change? (s,e)
More indirect mode changes will be introduced as the PVS model is expanded. This lemma will
make it simple to maintain an explicit list of all indirect mode changes.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Directions
7.1 Conclusions
This project has explored ways to detect mode confusion through deeper scrutiny of the behavior
of the automation. This approach makes use of two complementary strategies. The first is to
create a clear, executable model of the automation, connect it to a simulation of the flight deck,
and use this combination to review of the behavior of the automation and the man-machine
interface with engineers, the pilots, and experts in human factors. The second is to conduct
mathematical analyses of the model. In addition, the models and visualizations are consistent
with an architecture that supports a product family approach to the development of Flight
Guidance Systems.
7.1.1 Visualization of the Automation
Creating a clear model of the automation that can be connected to a simulation of the flight deck
and executed has several benefits. One of the most important is to provide a common focus that
facilitates discussion between pilots, experts in human factors, and the system designers. Chapter
4 attempts to illustrate the value of this with a few examples. Unfortunately, static examples
cannot really convey the utility of stepping through the simulation with an audience of experts
from different disciplines. Our experiences to date have shown that, if anything, we
underestimated the power of this technique. In every demonstration, the visualization has
generated vigorous, positive debate between these groups.
A secondary benefit is to force the development and commitment to a high level design of the
automation. It is our belief that this leads naturally to simpler systems. In projects developed
without such a vision, design choices may be based on local concerns, such as fixing the
immediate problem at hand or achieving a certain level of performance, and this tends to result in
unnecessary complexity that is confusing to both the users and developers of the system.
Moreover, this complexity tends to grow as the system evolves over time. Having a clear, high
level model of the automation encourages the developers (and customers) to make changes
consistent with this model as time progresses.
We do not yet know if a dynamic, high level model of the automation would be of value during
training of the flight crew. The few times we have demonstrated the simulation to pilots, they
have tended to focus on the details of the particular flight control system and have been
noncommittal to its potential for use during training. We suspect that they would be much more
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interestedin the simulationif it describedan actualairplanethey fly rather than the example
describedin [15].
Onebenefitwehadnot anticipatedat thestartof theprojectwasthevalueof creatinga modelof
the automationspecificallytailored for conveyinganaccuratementalmodelof the automation.
Early in theproject,it becameclearthat afull executablespecificationof theautomationwasnot
appropriatefor conveyinga mentalmodel of the automation.Instead,we focusedon creatinga
visualizationof the automation(Figure5) that conveyedwhat we felt was the most relevant
information.While this model wasa true abstractionof the automation(i.e., everyproperty of
themodelwasalsoapropertyof theautomation),it left outmanydetailsthatwouldbeneededto
actuallyimplementthemodelogic in orderto not obscurethekey ideas.As ourexperiencewith
the model grew,we beganto realize that theremight be additional information that could be
incorporatedinto thevisualizationto help conveythe appropriatementalmodel. For example,
onereviewersuggestedcoloringthetransitionslastexecuteda differentcolorfrom theothers.
7.1.2 Automated Analysis of the Model
At the start of the project, it was not clear how useful automated analyses, especially using the
PVS theorem prover, would be in detecting sources of mode confusion. However, as the project
progressed, we found ourselves relying more upon the PVS models and our ability to prove
properties and less upon the executable ObjecTime models and the visualizations.
As described in Section 4.1, our goal of adopting an architecture for a family of Flight Guidance
Systems lead naturally to a specification consisting of many, small, reusable components. The
ability to prove key relationships between these components, such as only one lateral mode is
active at a time (Section 6.1), was very helpful. Component based development (and
specification) appears to be on the rise as companies try to find ways to reduce costs through
systematic reuse and product family development. While this makes specification of the smaller
components simpler, it increases the need to verify properties of the overall system. This
suggests that component based approaches, including those found in many object-oriented
methods, increase rather than decrease the need for formal analysis.
We found that combining the proofs of the key relationships along with the proofs of many
simple properties provided us with a valuable regression suite. After making any change to the
model, such as adding a new mode, we routinely ran the entire suite of proofs. More often than
not, one or more proofs would no longer go through to completion. This then led us to inspect
the model to determine if that property should still be true and if so, why it no longer held. This
ability to automatically check for behavior that we would normally check manually was an easy
way to maintain a high level of confidence in our model.
Using PVS to detect sources of mode confusion was one of the most novel aspects of the project.
Using PVS to find all states in which crew inputs are ignored (Section 6.3.2) and all indirect
mode changes (Section 6.3.3) illustrates to how a wide variety of sources of mode confusion can
be detected in such models. The central question here is which potential sources of mode
confusion can be described formally. For example, it is not clear how the notion of inconsistent
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behaviorcanbe statedformally, but in Section6.3.1we discussedhow a few simpleforms of
inconsistentbehaviorcanbe formalized. We believethereis roomfor muchmorework in this
area.
7.1.3 Support for Product Families
It is notable that the ObjecTime models, the visualizations of the mode logic, and the PVS
models are all consistent with a product family architecture designed to accommodate the most
important variations found in Flight Guidance Systems, the configuration of modes installed on
the aircraft. The architecture described in Section 4.1 and that described in [15] are considerably
different, even though their overall behavior is similar. It is our belief that the architecture
described here not only supports product family variations better, but is a clearer and more
intuitive representation of the mode logic.
We find it intriguing that the same architecture can support both a clear mental model of the
automation and product family variations. At least on the surface, there is no obvious connection
between these two goals. However, if most variations result from the different ways in which a
product is used in its environment, it may be that the simplest mental model is naturally
compatible with an architecture that supports these variations. In this one example, that seems to
be the case.
In any case, if complex systems are to be affordable, planning for change and reuse has to play a
larger role in the future, and the simplest way to achieve this is by developing an architecture for
an entire family of products. Since a mental model of the automation must be an abstraction of
the actual implementation, i.e., every property of the model must also be true of the
implementation, it is encouraging that the goals of providing a clear mental model and a product
family architecture do not appear to be in conflict.
In contrast, the architecture described in Section 4.1 did make the proofs more difficult to
complete. However, this could always be overcome by first proving lemmas about the overall
system state that could then be used in the main proofs.
7.2 Future Directions
There are several areas for future work. These include extending the existing models with more
modes, developing more analyses for mode confusion, integrating the properties of flight control
laws into the models, investigating alternative architectures for the FGS, extensions to the
visualization to convey an accurate mental model of the automation, and making extensions to
PVS to simplify modeling.
7.2.1 Extending the Models
Only part of the mode logic described in the CoRE FGS specification [15] was modeled in Phase
I. In particular, the complex interactions between Vertical Approach and the other modes,
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especially lateral Approach, were not completed. Altitude Select mode has not yet been modeled,
precisely because it is one of the more complex vertical modes that imposes several constraints
between it and the other vertical modes. Even in the modes currently modeled, not all the
constraints between them have been specified. For example, the constraint that the system can be
in lateral Go Around mode if and only if it is in vertical Go Around mode is missing. All of these
are areas for further work.
Beyond this, the original CoRE FGS specification did not include the complex vertical
navigation modes found in modern Flight Guidance Systems. These are known to be one of the
main sources of mode confusion [9]. Extending the model with modes beyond those in CoRE
specification is another area for further work.
7.2.2 Extending the Analyses
In [13], the authors identify six common sources of mode confusion. In Section 6.3 we attempted
to formally state of few of these and use the PVS prover to detect instances of them in our
models. However, much more work remains to be done in this area. It should be possible to
formally characterize many more potential sources of mode confusion and search for them using
automated tools.
7.2.3 Integration of Flight Control Laws
The models described here do not include the flight control laws that actually generate the flight
guidance commands. Incorporating this information into the models may be necessary to
investigate some forms of mode confusion. The crash of an Airbus A330-322 in Toulouse,
France on 6/30/1994 illustrates this claim [2]. During a flight test of a simulated engine failure,
an unexpected mode transition to altitude acquisition (ALT*) occurred. Pitch protection was not
provided in ALT* mode, although it was present in all of the other modes. Detection of
inconsistent behavior such as this will require elaboration of the basic properties of the control
laws in addition to the mode structure.
7.2.4 Investigation of Alternative Architectures
The architecture for the models presented in this report have assumed that the coupling between
the lateral and vertical guidance modes is minimal. However, some lateral and vertical modes are
more closely coupled than others. For example, Section 4.2 describes how the lateral and vertical
Approach modes are closely synchronized. In some aircraft, the lateral and vertical Go Around
are effectively a single mode since if either is active, the other must also be active.
As discussed in Section 2.1, IA. A. Lambregts, FAA National Resource Specialist for Advanced
Controls, argues that much of the complexity of the flight deck derives from the independent
design of the autopilot and the autothrottle [11]. Addressing these concerns could require both
integration of the properties of the flight control laws and the investigation of alternative
architectures.
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7.2.5 Visualization of the Automation
In Section 7.1.1 we discussed the unanticipated benefit of creating a visualization of the
automation specifically tailored for conveying an accurate mental model of the automation. Not
only did we decide that there was value in leaving some information out of the visualization in
order to not obscure the main points, but that there was value in including some information that
would not normally be included in a requirements or design model. Precisely what information
should be omitted or included in the visualization to best convey a useful mental model of the
automation is yet another topic for future work.
7.2.6 Extensions to PVS
We occasionally found the goals of creating a product family architecture and specifying the
mode logic in PVS to be in conflict. While specification of the simpler components, such as
Simple_Guidance and Arming_Guidance, was straightforward, the "glue" theories such
as Lateral_Guidance, Vertical_Guidance, and Flight_Guidance were much
more difficult. We attribute much of this to the lack of domain specific constructs for
communication between components. For example, notations such as ObjecTime [21] and SCR
[7] provide explicit constructs for communication between components and determining the
order in which events are processed. Since PVS is a general purpose notation, comparable
capabilities had to be explicitly constructed in the glue theories. For example, our use of events
and signals is a rudimentary communications mechanism between the components of the FGS.
Developing a reusable infrastructure in PVS to facilitate assembling component specifications
into an overall system specification, much as was done in [19] for SCR, is another area we would
like to investigate.
To achieve a product family architecture, the FGS model makes extensive use of information
hiding. For example, the states of a mode, which states are active, and the transitions between
states are encapsulated in the Simplified_Guidance and Arming_Guidance theories.
At each level, the synchronization between components is specified in to the parent component
to ensure that siblings had no information about their peers. However, all of this was done
implicitly. In Phase II, we would like to investigate if the information hiding capabilities of PVS
can be used to enforce this explicitly.
The lack of state variables in PVS also made creating the models more difficult. In the FGS,
system state was modeled as a record structure that mirrors the FGS architecture. Evaluation of a
system function also mirrors the FGS architecture, with a function in a component recursively
calling functions in its child components. At each step, the appropriate component of state is
extracted and passed as a parameter to the child function. If the function returns a state, the state
is reconstructed as the evaluation returns. While state variables would probably make proofs
more complicated, it would be much more natural and intuitive to embed state variables in the
appropriate components.
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